Despite the enormous theoretical and experimental progress made so far in quantum key distribution (QKD), the security of most existing QKD implementations is not rigorously established yet. A critical obstacle is that almost all existing security proofs make ideal assumptions on the QKD devices. Problematically, such assumptions are hard to satisfy in the experiments, and therefore it is not obvious how to apply such security proofs to practical QKD systems. Fortunately, any imperfections and security-loopholes in the measurement devices can be perfectly closed by measurement-device-independent QKD (MDI-QKD), and thus we only need to consider how to secure the source devices. Among imperfections in the source devices, correlations between the sending pulses are one of the principal problems. In this paper, we consider a setting-choice-independent correlation (SCIC) framework in which the sending pulses can present arbitrary correlations but they are independent of the previous setting choices such as the bit, the basis and the intensity settings. Within the framework of SCIC, we consider the dominant fluctuations of the sending states, such as the relative phases and the intensities, and provide a self-contained information theoretic security proof for the loss-tolerant QKD protocol in the finite-key regime. We demonstrate the feasibility of secure quantum communication within a reasonable number of pulses sent, and thus we are convinced that our work constitutes a crucial step toward guaranteeing implementation security of QKD.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1] is one of the most promising applications of quantum information processing, and it is now on the verge of global commercialization. Nonetheless, there are still several theoretical and experimental challenges [2] that need to be addressed before its wide-scale deployment. One such challenge is the lack of practical security proofs that bridge the gap between theory and practice. In the security proof of QKD, one typically assumes some mathematical models for Alice and Bob's devices. However, if these models do not faithfully capture the physical properties of the actual QKD devices, the security of the systems is no longer guaranteed. In fact, such discrepancies between device models assumed in security proofs and the properties of actual devices could be exploited by Eve to attack both the source [3, 4] and the detection apparatuses [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] . It is therefore indispensable for realising secure QKD to develop security proof techniques that can be applied to actual devices.
One possible approach to close this gap is to use device-independent QKD [13] [14] [15] [16] . Its main drawback is, however, that it delivers a quite low secret key rate with current technology, and it still requires some device characterisations
1 . An alternative solution is to use measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD [19] , which guarantees the security of QKD without making any assumption on the measurement device. That is, MDI-QKD completely closes the security loophole in the detection unit. This technique still requires, however, that certain assumptions on the source device are satisfied.
Unfortunately, the status of the security proofs with practical light sources is not fully satisfactory, as so far only a few security proofs accommodate realistic imperfections in the source device. Among the imperfections in the source, one of the crucial problems is the presence of correlations among the sending pulses. We categorize these correlations into two types: the first type is the setting-choice-independent correlation (SCIC) where the correlation is independent of Alice's choices of settings such as the bit, the basis, and the intensity settings, and the second type is the settingchoice-dependent correlation (SCDC) where the correlation is dependent on Alice's setting choices. For instance, the former case (SCIC) may arise when the temperature in the laser drifts slowly over time due to thermal effects, where such drift could depend on how long we have operated a device and the ambient temperature of the room. Another example may be found in modulation devices which are operated by power supply fluctuating in time. On the other hand, the latter case (SCDC) occurs when the i th sending state could depend on the previous setting choices that Alice has made up to the (i − 1) th pulse. That is to say, secret information encoded in the previous quantum signals sent by Alice could be leaked to subsequent quantum signals sent by Alice. In other words, subsequent signals could act as side channels for previous signals. Recently, the SCDC between the intensities of different pulses has been observed experimentally [20] . Also, the authors of [20] conducted a security analysis which is valid for the restricted scenario where only the nearest neighbour correlation is considered. More in general, however, the i th state could be dependent on all the previous setting choices that Alice has made. This general correlation seems to be very hard to deal with theoretically, and even if we would have a theoretical countermeasure against it, the characterisation of the device might be highly non-trivial. Fortunately, it would be reasonable to assume that the SCDC could be eliminated if the modulation devices are initialized each time after Alice emits a pulse. For instance, before Alice sends the (i + 1) th pulse, she applies a random voltage to the modulation devices several times until the setting-choice information up to the i th pulse which is stored in the device is deleted. This potential solution may decrease the repetition rate of the source, however, this could be overcome by multiplexing several sources, for instance by employing integrated silicon photonics [21] [22] [23] . With this reasonable solution, we are left with rigorously dealing with the SCIC.
In this paper, we consider the dominant fluctuations of the sending state, such as the relative phase [24] [25] [26] [27] and the intensity [20, 24, 28, 29] within the framework of SCIC, and we provide an information theoretic security proof in the finite-key regime. In particular, we consider the loss-tolerant QKD protocol [30] that is a BB84 type protocol which, unlike the standard BB84 protocol [31] , has the advantage of being robust against phase modulation errors. The loss-tolerant protocol is highly practical and has been experimentally demonstrated in both prepare & measure QKD [26, 32] and MDI-QKD [27] . Our main contribution is to explicitly write down all the assumptions that we impose on QKD systems, and by using only these assumptions we give a self-contained security proof. Our numerical simulations of the key generation rate show that provably secure keys can be distributed over long distance within a reasonable number of pulses sent, e.g, 10 12 pulses. The paper is organised as follows. In section II, we describe the assumptions that we make on Alice and Bob's devices and we introduce the protocol considered. In section III, we present a formula for the key generation length of the protocol. This formula depends on certain parameters that need to be estimated; the estimation results for these parameters are shown in section IV. Then in section V, we present our numerical simulation results for the key generation rate. Here, we assume realistic intervals for the actual phases and intensities under the framework of SCIC, and we show that secure communication is possible within a reasonable time frame of signal transmission, say 10 12 signals. Finally, section VI summarises the paper. There are also various appendixes describing all the detailed derivations of the parameters in the key rate.
II. ASSUMPTIONS AND PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION
Here, we introduce the assumptions on Alice and Bob's devices and the protocol we consider throughout this paper. To describe the assumptions, we use a shorthand notation X i := X i , X i−1 , ..., X 1 for a sequence of random variables {X j } i j=1 and X 0 := 0. In what follows, we first summarise the assumptions we make on the sending devices as well as those on the measurement devices, and then we move on to the description of the protocol.
A. Assumptions on Alice's transmitter (A-1) Assumption on the sending stateρ i (θ i , µ i ) B i We assume that Alice employs a coherent light source with a Poissonian photon number distribution in any basis, bit and intensity setting. Here we denote by c i ∈ C := {0 Z , 1 Z , 0 X } Alice's bit and basis choice for the i th pulse,
This figure exemplifies the SCDC that is forbidden in our security assumptions (with Nsent = 3). It shows that the i th internal state of the source device g i depends on the previous outcomes θ i−1 and µ i−1 . In this case, the secret information contained in the previous quantum signals (namely, c i−1 and k i−1 ) could be leaked to the i th quantum signal sent by Alice. In other words, the i th sending signal could act as a side channel for the previous (i − 1) th signals.
and k i ∈ K := {k 1 , k 2 , k 3 } Alice's intensity setting choice for the i th pulse 2 . Moreover, we consider that the i th signals are in a single-mode 3 . Also, we assume that she uses phase encoding, i.e., she encodes the i th bit and basis information into the relative phase θ i between two pulses, a signal and a reference pulse, whose common phase δ ∈ [0, 2π) is perfectly randomized. We denote by µ i the i th actual value of the intensity generated by Alice's source. Mathematically, given the phase and the intensity, the i th sending stateρ i (θ i , µ i ) B i to Bob in the system B i can be described asρ
Here, we assume that the intensities of the signal and the reference pulses are the same and equal to µ i /2 4 . In Eq. (1), we defineP [|· ] := |· ·|, the subscripts S i and R i respectively represent the optical modes of the i th signal and reference pulse, and
where
Furthermore, we suppose that there are no side-channels in Alice's source and Eve can only manipulate Bob's system B with her arbitrary prepared ancilla.
In the following, we first explain our correlation model for the source device, and we make assumptions on how the phases {θ i } Nsent i=1 and the intensities {µ i } Nsent i=1 are determined in the source device, where N sent denotes the number of pulse pairs (signal and reference pulses) sent by Alice. See Fig. 1 for a schematic explanation of our correlation model of the source device. For illustration purposes, we exemplify in Fig. 2 the setting-choice-dependent correlation (SCDC) that is not taken into account in our security analysis. (A-2) Assumption on the correlation: Setting-choice-independent correlation (SCIC)
The correlation model we consider is the setting-choice-independent correlation (SCIC), which means that the internal state of the source device which determines the i th sending state is arbitrarily correlated with the previous internal states of the source device but it does not depend on the previous setting choices made by Alice. Weintensity for k i . (A-6) Assumption on the intervals for the phase and intensity
The i th interval of the phase R c i ph is assumed to be given by
for all instances i, where R 
for all instances i, and we suppose that the following three conditions are satisfied
Assumption on the number of tagged signals
We define the good set G Nsent good of g Nsent as that whose number of tagged events n tag := |{i|g i / ∈ G i unt }| is upper bounded by a constant number N tag as
We suppose that the probability of g Nsent not being an element of G Nsent good is upper bounded by p fail , which is expressed as We suppose that whether a detection occurs or not for each pulse pairs does not depend on the chosen measurement basis b i ; this condition is represented asM
(B-2) Assumption on random choice of the measurement basis We assume that Bob measures each incoming signal in a basis b i ∈ B chosen independently of the previous basis choices and measurement outcomes. This condition is expressed in terms of the probability distribution as
Furthermore, we suppose that there are no side-channels in Bob's measurement device. Let us remark that our security model allows the use of threshold detectors; this simply implies that Bob's Z and X basis measurements are not necessarily measurements on a qubit space. Note also that any error in the detection apparatus (say, for example, modulation errors) can be accommodated in our security proof as long as the assumptions stated in (B-1) and (B-2) are satisfied.
Description of the actual protocol with a typical measurement setup. In the i th trial (with 1 ≤ i ≤ Nsent), Alice's source device emits two consecutive coherent pulses: a signal and a reference pulse. Alice first inputs the basis and bit information c i ∈ C and the intensity setting k i ∈ K that she selects probabilistically. Let θ i and µ i denote the relative phase between the signal and the reference pulses and the total actual intensity of both pulses, respectively. On the receiving side, Bob uses a 50:50 beamsplitter (BS) to split the received pulses into two beams. Afterward, he applies a phase shift 0 or π/2 to one of them according to his basis choice b i = Z or b i = X, respectively. The pulses are then recombined at a 50:50 BS. A click in the detector D0 (D1) provides Bob the bit y i = 0 (y i = 1).
C. Protocol description
In this section, we describe the protocol of which we prove the security. See Fig. 3 for a typical setup of the actual protocol. In particular, we consider the loss-tolerant protocol [30] . Also, we suppose that Alice uses the decoy-state method [33] [34] [35] with one signal and two decoys, and we consider asymmetric coding, i.e., the Z and X bases are chosen with probabilities p
respectively. In addition, we assume that the secret key is generated from those events where both Alice and Bob select the Z basis regardless of their intensity settings.
Next, we show in detail how the protocol runs. In its description, |A| represents the cardinality of a set or length of a bit string depending on whether A is a set or a bit string, respectively. The protocol is composed of the following steps: 0. Device characterisation and protocol parameter choice First, Alice characterises her source to determine the value of the parameters R c ph , R k int for all c ∈ C and k ∈ K, N tag and p fail . Also, Alice and Bob decide the secrecy parameter s given by Eq. (19) , the correctness parameter c , the upper bound on N sent which we shall denote by N , and the quantity N det that is associated to the termination condition.
After this characterisation step, Alice (Bob) repeats the following step 1 (step 2) and both Alice and Bob repeat step 3 for i = 1, ..., N sent until the condition in the sifting step is met 7 .
Preparation
For each i, Alice randomly selects the intensity setting k i ∈ K with probabilities p k1 := p(
, and the basis a i ∈ B with probabilities p A Z and p
Afterward, if a i = Z she chooses the bit information with probability 1/2; otherwise, she chooses c i = 0 X . Finally, she generates the signal and reference pulses according to her choice of k i and c i , and sends them to Bob via a quantum channel.
Measurement
Bob measures the incoming signal and reference pulses using the measurement basis b i ∈ B, which he selects with probabilities p
The outcome is recorded as {0, 1, ⊥, ∅}, where ⊥ and ∅ represent, respectively, a double click event, i.e., the two detectors click, and a no click event. If the outcome is ⊥, Bob assigns a random bit to the event 8 . As a result, Bob obtains y i ∈ {0, 1, ∅}. The outcomes 0 and 1 will be called a detection event.
3. Sifting 7 Note that we adopt the iterative sifting procedure with a basis independent termination condition, which has been recently analysed in [36] . In this procedure, after each quantum transmission round, Bob announces whether or not the received signal produced a detection click in his measurement apparatus. And, in the case of a detection click, both Alice and Bob announce their basis choices, and Bob also declares his measurement outcome except for the event where both of them selected the Z basis. Then, the quantum communication part of the protocol terminates when the basis independent termination condition is satisfied. 8 Note that this random assignment is not mandatory. Indeed, Bob can always choose a particular bit value, say 0, for the double click events. This deterministic procedure also preserves the basis-independence detection efficiency condition described in Eq. (14) .
Bob declares over an authenticated public channel whether or not he obtained a detection event. If yes, Alice and Bob annouce their basis choices, and Alice identifies if the event can be assigned to the following sets for all k ∈ K:
Alice asks Bob to also announce his measurement outcome, and Alice identifies if the event can be assigned to the following sets for all c ∈ C, k ∈ K, b ∈ B and y ∈ {0, 1}:
Then, Alice checks if the following termination condition is satisfied for a prefixed N det : S det := |S det | ≥ N det for the set S det = {i|y i = ∅}. Once this termination condition is met after sending N sent pulses, the results associated to the set S Z,Z,det := ∪ k∈K S Z,Z,k,det form Alice and Bob's sifted keys κ 
III. SECRET KEY GENERATION LENGTH
In this section, we present a formula to compute the secret key generation length that guarantees that the protocol introduced above is sec -secure. According to the universal composable security framework [37, 38] , we say that a protocol is sec -secure if it is both c -correct and s -secret where sec = c + s [39] . We say that the protocol is
holds in terms of the trace norm, whereρ
is a classical-quantum state between Alice's final key and Eve's system after finishing the protocol andρ ideal AE is an ideal state in which Alice's key is uniformly distributed over 2 |κ fin A | values and decoupled from Eve's system. We suppose that the following two conditions for the random variables S Z,Z,1,u,det and N ph,Z,Z,1,u,det are satisfied
regardless of Eve's attack. In this case, for any PA > 0, by setting [40, 41] 
it can be shown that the protocol is c -correct and s -secret if the final key length satisfies
where h(x) is the binary entropy function, and λ EC ( c ) is the cost of error correction to achieve c -correctness.
IV. RESULTS OF PARAMETER ESTIMATION
In this section, we summarise the estimation results of S L Z,Z,1,u,det and N U ph,Z,Z,1,u,det . All the detailed derivations of these quantities can be found in Appendices D and E, respectively.
First, regarding the estimation of S L Z,Z,1,u,det , we employ the decoy-state method and we obtain the lower bound on
except for error probability Z := . Second, in the estimation of the number of phase errors N ph,Z,Z,1,u,det for the untagged single-photon emission events in κ sift A , we follow the arguments in the loss-tolerant protocol in [24, 25, 30] . In the main text, for simplicity of its expression, we only describe N ph,Z,Z,1,u,det with the following restricted phase intervals:
Note that the expression of N ph,Z,Z,1,u,det with the general phase intervals in Eq. (10) should be refereed to Appendix E 2. Under the assumption of Eq. (22), N U ph,Z,Z,1,u,det can be written as a linear combination of the parameters S c,1,u,det,y,X , which are bounds on the cardinality of the sets S c,1,u,det,y,X = {i|c
Here, we define the statistical fluctuation term of the Azuma's inequality [42] as g A (x, y) := 2x ln 1/y and the functions {Γ
. Regarding S c,1,u,det,y,X , we take the following upper or lower bounds on S c,1,u,det,y,X := |S c,1,u,det,y,X |, depending on the sign of Γ U y,c , such that N ph,Z,Z,1,u,det takes its upper bound: and
where S − c,k,u,det,y,X := S c,k,det,y,X − N tag . Finally, we calculate the failure probability PH associated to the estimation of N 
V. SIMULATION OF THE KEY RATE
In this section, we show the numerical simulation results of the key rate for a fibre-based QKD system. In the simulation, we assume that Bob uses a measurement setup with two single-photon detectors with detection efficiency η det = 10% and dark count probability per pulse p dark = 10 −5 . These parameters are set to be the same as those in [43] . The attenuation coefficient of the optical fibre is 0.2 dB/km and its transmittance is η ch = 10 −0.2l/10 with l denoting the fibre length. We denote the channel transmission rate including detection efficiency by η := η ch η det . The overall misalignment error of the measurement system is fixed to be e mis = 1%. In addition, we assume an error correction cost equals to λ EC ( c ) = 1.05 × |κ sift A |h(e bit ) + log 2 (1/ c ), where e bit is the bit error rate of the sifted key (κ 
−3 ] with µ k denoting the expected intensity (we suppose that µ k3 = 0) and where r k represents the deviation of the actual intensity from the expected value. For the intervals of the phase fluctuation R (22), we take the experimental value of phase modulation error from Ref. [26] and we set θ = 0.03 rad 9 . In Fig. 4 , we consider the two cases: (I) N tag = 0 and p fail = 0 and (II) N tag = N sent × 10
and p fail = 0. The case (I) means that all the phases and the intensities lie in their intervals, and the case (II) means that the number of tagged events is upper bounded by N sent × 10 −7 . Regarding the numbers of detection events S Z,Z,k,det and S c,k,det,y,b , we generate these quantities by assuming the following specific setup. In particular, for the i th trial, we consider that Alice sends Bob pairs of coherent states through the fibre of the form |e
. Bob measures the incoming signals using a Mach-Zehnder interferometer with two 50:50 BSs and a phase modulator as shown in Fig. 3 . More precisely, he uses a first 50:50 BS to split the received pulses into two beams, and after that he applies a phase shift 0 or π/2 to one of them according to his basis choice of b i = Z or b i = X, respectively, and finally he lets interfere the resulting pulses using a second 50:50 BS. In this setup, we obtain the following probabilities:
for y ∈ {0, 1}, and p(
for y, x ∈ {0, 1}. Moreover, we assume that the bit error rate e bit is given by e bit = y=0,1 p(
With these probabilities, we suppose that the experimentally observed numbers satisfy
With the above parameters, we simulate the key rate SCIC /N sent for a fixed value of the correctness and secrecy parameters c = s = 10 −10 and we set Z = 1/2 × 10 −10 , PA = PH = 1/16 × 10 −20 , and
. We also assume that each failure probability which is contained in the expression of In the simulation, we perform a numerical optimization of the key rate SCIC /N sent over the two free parameters µ k1 and µ k2 . In the solid and dashed lines in Fig. 4 , we respectively plot the key rate of the cases (I) and (II) for the finite-case when N sent ∈ {10 10 , 10 10.5 , 10 11 , 10 11.5 , 10 12 } (from left to right). For comparison, the rightmost solid and dashed lines respectively correspond to the asymptotic key rate of the cases (I) and (II), where no statistical fluctuation terms in Eqs. (21) and (23) are taken into account. Our simulation results show the feasibility of secure key distribution within a reasonable time by employing practical devices that satisfy our device assumptions. For instance, if Alice uses a laser diode operating at 1 GHz repetition rate and she sends N sent = 10 12 signals, then we find that it is possible to distribute a 1-Mb secret key over a 75-km fibre link in < 0.3 hours. This scenario corresponds to the solid blue line (the fifth solid line from the left) shown in Fig. 4 .
VI. CONCLUSION
In summary, we have provided an information theoretic security proof for the loss-tolerant QKD protocol which accommodates the setting-choice-independent correlation (SCIC) in the finite key regime. Within the framework of SCIC, the relative phases and intensities of the sending coherent states fluctuate over time. Once realistic intervals for these fluctuations (such as for instance ±0.03 rad and ±3%, respectively) are guaranteed, our numerical simulations have shown that secure quantum communication is feasible with a reasonable number of signal transmissions such as for example N sent = 10 12 . Therefore, our results constitute a significant step toward realising secure quantum communication with practical source devices. On a more general outlook, it would be of great practical interest to improve the convergence speed of the key rate in the finite-key regime and it would be also important to weaken the requirements for Alice's source device which could lead to a simpler characterisation of the source devices.
Appendix A: Summary of notations A list of the parameters used throughout this paper together with their notation is provided in Tables I and II .
Random variables and sets
Meaning Untagged set of the i th internal state of the source device
Number of tagged signals:
Set of g N sent where ntag is upper bounded by a fixed number 
Lower bound on |S Z,Z,1,u,det | N ph,Z,Z,1,u,det
Number of phase errors in the set S Z,Z,1,u,det N U ph,Z,Z,1,u,det
Upper bound on N ph,Z,Z,1,u,det 
Upper bound on the probability that g
Predetermined number of detection events
Alice's (Bob's) sifted key 
i and µ i , respectively. According to the assumption (A-1), note that these five systems are possessed by Alice. This is to ensure that there is no side channel leaking information to Eve. Also,
is a purified state of Eq. (2) with N i being a system storing the number of photons contained in the i th sending state, which has the form
Proof of Theorem 1 For the most general case, the total N sent sending states can be coherently written as
Next, we calculate p(g Nsent , P Nsent ) using the assumptions (A-2)-(A-5). Here, we introduce the Modified Azuma's inequality [44] that we use in the decoy-state method (see Appendix D).
Theorem 2 (Modified Azuma's inequality) [44] . Let Y i be an i th random variable with Y 0 := 0 (0 ≤ i ≤ n) defined on the probability space (Ω, F, p) with the filtration F 0 ⊂ F 1 ⊂ · · · ⊂ F n = F, where F 0 is the trivial σ-algebra {∅, Ω} and F is the power set of Ω (consisting of all the subsets of Ω). We suppose that the sequence of random variables
the Martingale condition:
the bounded difference condition:
and the zero-difference condition:
for a constant q (0 ≤ q ≤ 1). Then, for any > 0, we have that
are satisfied, where g MA ( , q, n) is defined by
For completeness, below we prove Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 2 For convenience, we define ∆ j := Y j − Y j−1 , and we have that for any s > 0
where g(x) := (e x − 1 − x)/x 2 with g(0) = 1/2. Here, in Eq. (C9) we use Eqs. (C1) and (C2), in Eq. (C10) we use Eq. (C3) and the fact that g(x) is a monotonically increasing function, and finally in Eq. (C11) we use Eqs. (C3) and (C4). We also have that for any t > 0, 
with φ(x) :
By setting exp − t 2 2nq+2t/3 = , we obtain Eq. (C5). Also, Eq. (C6) can be proven in a similar way.
Appendix D: Decoy-state method
In this Appendix, we present the decoy-state method that we use to estimate bounds on the parameters S c,n,u,det,y,X and S Z,Z,n,u,det for n = 1 in the presence of intensity fluctuations within the framework of SCIC. Here, S c,n,u,det,y,X denotes the cardinality of the set S c,n,u,det,y,X = {i|c i = c, n i = n, t i = u, b i = X, y i = y} (with y ∈ {0, 1}). More precisely, the goal here is to bound the quantities S c,n=1,u,det,y,X and S Z,Z,n=1,u,det
with the available experimentally observed data, that is,
respectively. We first derive the upper and lower bounds on S c,1,u,det,y,X (see Sec. D 1), and after that we derive the lower bound on S Z,Z,1,u,det (see Sec. D 2). To achieve this goal, we divide the task into four steps. To illustrate the method, let us consider for instance the case for S c,1,u,det,y,X . In step 1, we use the Modified Azuma's inequality to relate the numbers S c,1,u,det,y,X and S c,k,u,det,y,X with the quantities S c,1,u,y,X det in Eq. (D11) and S c,k,u,y,X det in Eq. (D3), respectively. Here, S c,k,u,det,y,X denotes the cardinality of the set S c,k,u,det,y,X = {i|c i = c, k
In step 2, we derive the bounds on S c,k,u,y,X det by using the functions {f c,n,u,y,X|det } n that are related to the quantities { S c,n,u,y,X det } n . Here, S c,n,u,y,X det and f c,n,u,y,X|det are defined in Eqs. (D11) and (D22) respectively. In step 3, we derive the bounds on S c,n=1,u,y,X det with { S c,k,u,y,X det } k . In step 4, we finally combine Eqs. (D25) and (D30) with Eqs. (D10) and (D12) which are obtained by means of the Modified Azuma's inequality, and we obtain the bounds on S c,n=1,u,det,y,X with the observed data {S c,k,det,y,X } k∈K .
1. Upper and lower bounds on S c,1,u,det,y,X a. Step 1. Modified Azuma's inequality
In order to obtain upper and lower bounds on S c,1,u,det,y,X , we first relate the numbers S c,1,u,det,y,X and S c,k,u,det,y,X with the quantities S c,1,u,y,X det and S c,k,u,y,X det , respectively. In the discussion, we use a shorthand notation χ 
Here, δ(x, y) denotes the Kronecker delta. To relate Eq. (D3) with the number S c,k,u,det,y,X , we introduce the following random variable
where S j det is the set containing the first j elements of the set S det , and Λ j c,k,u,y,X denotes the number of instances where (c, k, u, X, y) is realised among the set S j det , namely, Λ j c,k,u,y,X = i∈S
Then, the random variables {Y 
we can confirm that the Martingale condition 
Here, we identify the filtration F j−1 with the random variables (χ 
Here, c,k,u,y,X MA denotes the failure probability associated to the estimation of S c,k,u,y,X det , and the function g MA ( c,k,u,y,X MA , p B X , N det ) is defined in Eq. (C7). Note that the quantity S c,k,u,det,y,X in Eqs. (D7) and (D8) is not directly observed in the actual experiments, and we only know its range, given that the number of tagged signals n tag is upper bounded by N tag , as
where S c,k,det,y,X := |S c,k,det,y,X |. By combining Eqs. (D7), (D8) and (D9), we obtain
except for error probability 2 c,k,u,y,X MA . The bounds on S c,n=1,u,det,y,X will be expressed as a function of the rhs and the lhs of Eq. (D10).
Next, we define the quantity S c,n,u,y,X det that will be related to the number S c,n,u,det,y,X through the Modified Azuma's inequality as
and we follow the above arguments about the Modified Azuma's inequality. As a result, we obtain
except for error probability 2 c,n,u,y,X MA . From Eqs. (D10) and (D12) obtained by means of the Modified Azuma's inequality, we find that the remaining task is to bound S c,1,u,y,X det with { S c,k,u,y,X det } k such that S c,1,u,det,y,X can be bounded by the observed data appearing in Eq. (D10). Next, in step 2, we relate the expectation S c,k,u,y,X det with { S c,n,u,y,X det } n through some functions {f c,n,u,y,X|det } n , and then by using this relation we bound S c,1,u,y,X det with { S c,k,u,y,X det } k in step 3.
b.
Step 2. Upper and lower bounds on S c,k,u,y,X det with {f c,n,u,y,X|det }n In this step, we bound S c,k,u,y,X det in Eq. (D3) with { S c,n,u,y,X det } n through the functions {f c,n,u,y,X|det } n . In the following discussion, we use the notation g ≥i := g i , g i+1 , ..., g Nsent . First, from the law of total probability, the definition (D-1) in Sec. II A and Bayes' theorem, Eq. (D3) can be rewritten as
Next, we calculate the first factor of Eq. (D13) to obtain Eq. (D20) below.
where in Eq. (D14) we use the decoy-state property, namely, p(
holds. This is because once g Nsent is fixed, Eq. (B1) assures that the total N sent sending states have a tensor product structure which implies that the information of k i is only encoded in the i th sending system B i , and the n-photon state in the system B i is the same for any choice of k i . In Eq. (D15) we use the assumption (B-2) in Sec. II B, in Eq. (D16) we recursively use the decoy-state property and the assumption (B-2), in Eqs. (D17) and (D19) we use the Bayes' theorem, and finally in Eqs. (D18) and (D20) we use Eq. (B1).
In Eq. (D20), from Eq. (11), ∀i ∈ S det and ∀g
] for n ≥ 1, which we denote by Pois
. With these bounds, S c,k,u,y,X det can be upper and lower bounded as
where we define the function
and
respectively. It is notable that Eq. (D21) represents a linear combination of {f c,n,u,y,X|det } n , and f c,n,u,y,X|det is independent of k, which is crucial in the next discussion.
c.
Step 3. Upper and lower bounds on Sc,n=1,u,y,X det with { S c,k,u,y,X det } k
In this step, we derive an upper and lower bounds on S c,n=1,u,y,X det with { S c,k,u,y,X det } k .
(i) Upper bound on S c,1,u,y,X det First, we derive an upper bound on S c,1,u,y,X det . From Eqs. (D21) and (D23), we have two inequalities: S c,k2,u,y,X det ≥ p k2 n Pois L (n|k 2 , u)f c,n,u,y,X|det and S c,k3,u,y,X det ≤ p k3 n Pois U (n|k 3 , u)f c,n,u,y,X|det . By combining them and using the conditions 1 > µ
(which we actually imposed in the protocol), f c,1,u,y,X|det is upper bounded by
Substituting the definition in Eq. (D22) gives the upper bound on S c,1,u,y,X det as
Here, we define Pois
(ii) Lower bound on S c,1,u,y,X det Next, we derive a lower bound on S c,1,u,y,X det . For this, we first use Eqs. (D21) and (D23), and we have three inequalities:
By combining the first two inequalities, it is easy to show that
If we assume µ
(which we actually imposed in the protocol), we have that (µ
) n holds for n ≥ 2 [45] . Therefore, Eq. (D27) leads to
which is equivalent to
If we assume 1 > µ + k1 (which we actually imposed in the protocol), by using in Eq. (D29), the third inequality in Eq. (D26) and the definition of f c,1,u,y,X|det in Eq. (D22), we obtain the lower bound on S c,1,u,y,X det as a function of { S c,k,u,y,X det } k as
Step
In this step, we finally derive the upper and the lower bounds on S c,n=1,u,det,y,X with experimentally observed data {S c,k,det,y,X } k .
(i) Upper bound on S c,1,u,det,y,X We combine Eqs. (D10) and (D12), which result from the application of the Modified Azuma's inequality, with Eq. (D25) to derive the upper bound on S c,1,u,det,y,X .
except for error probability 
(ii) Lower bound on S c,1,u,det,y,X Similarly, we combine Eqs. (D10) and (D12) with Eq. (D30) to derive the lower bound on S c,1,u,det,y,X .
except for error probability Just by following the same arguments that we use for the estimation of the bounds on S c,1,u,det,y,X in Secs. D 1 a-D 1 d, we find that S Z,Z,1,u,det is lower bounded by the following quantity:
except for error probability
Here, we define S
Schematic representation of the virtual protocol for the case Nsent = 4. For each i, Alice first sends the system B i to Bob via the quantum channel. The eavesdropper performs an arbitrary operation on this system, and sends the system B i to Bob. Bob applies to the systems received the filter operationF , and we classify the events into two cases depending on whether this filter operation is successful (the set of such successful events is denoted by S det , in the example S det = {1, 4}) or not. For the successful events, Alice and Bob perform a joint measurement on the systems
, respectively. For the failure events, Alice performs a measurement on the systems N i , G i and C i . In any case, once they have performed their measurements, Alice and Bob announce the relevant classical information (CI) over an authenticated public channel. This is illustrated with a dashed line in the figure. We can use this virtual protocol to prove the security of the actual protocol because the quantum and classical information that is accessible to Eve coincide in both cases (see Proposition 1).
Appendix E: Derivation of the phase error rate
In this Appendix, we derive an upper bound on the phase error rate e ph|Z,Z,1,u,det = N ph,Z,Z,1,u,det /S Z,Z,1,u,det . Importantly, the procedure introduced below is valid against coherent attacks. To derive an upper bound on e ph|Z,Z,1,u,det , we need to obtain an upper bound on the number of phase errors N ph,Z,Z,1,u,det . Below, in the first subsection, we explain the derivation of N ph,Z,Z,1,u,det with the restricted phase intervals in Eq. (22) , and in the second subsection, we explain how to obtain N ph,Z,Z,1,u,det with the general phase intervals in Eq. (10) from that with the restricted phase intervals.
1. Derivation of N ph,Z,Z,1,u,det with restricted phase intervals in Eq. (22) First, from Eq. (B1), we have that the total N sent states can be expressed as
In particular, |Υ i (θ i c i ,g i , 1) B i can be expressed as 
unt and n i = 1 by means of an entanglement-based scheme. That is, we assume that she first generates the state
, and afterwards she measures the system C i to obtain c i . In this subsection, given c i = c and g i ∈ G
i unt , we suppose that θ i c,g i lies in the following interval for any i:
To prove the security of the key generated from the Z basis, we follow the definition of the phase error rate. That is, we consider Alice and Bob's hypothetical measurements on their systems C i and B i (where B i represents the system B i after Eve's intervention) in the X basis given that Alice prepared the state |ψ
In this virtual scenario, we have therefore, that Alice sends Bob the state |ψ i vir,m,g i B i with probability p i vir,m,g i by projecting the system C i in the basis
For later convenience, we define
Thanks to Proposition 1 below, we are allowed to evaluate the security of the actual protocol by using the virtual scheme illustrated in Fig. 5 . In particular, we consider a virtual protocol where for each signal emission, Alice can in principle prepare the following state if
where the system A i is stored by Alice in a quantum memory. Here, the states {|ψ
and the probabilities {p i α i ,g i } α i are given by
Alice sends Bob the system B i in Eq. (E1), and Eve performs an arbitrary operation on this system. On the receiving side, thanks to the assumption (B-1) in Sec. II B, Bob can apply the filter operationF to the system B i to determine whether he will have a detection event (y i = ∅) or not (y i = ∅) prior to selecting the measurement basis, which is represented by the Kraus operators
Depending on this result, we classify all the emissions into two types of events:
(i) a successful event (which is associated to the operator Î B i −M ∅ ), and (ii) a failure event (which is associated to the operator M ∅ ).
We denote the set of successful events by S det := {i|y i = ∅} where S det := |S det |. Afterwards, we consider that Alice and Bob perform joint measurements on all the signals. In particular, for the successful event identified above as (i), we suppose that Alice measures her systems N i and G i , and if the outcomes are n i = 1 and g i ∈ G 
unt ∪ G i unt and c i ∈ C, respectively. Importantly, it can be shown that, from Eve's perspective, this virtual protocol is completely equivalent to the actual protocol given that Alice and Bob's announcements and classical post-processing are chosen appropriately.
Proposition 1 From Eve's perspective, the virtual protocol described above is equivalent to the actual protocol, namely, the quantum and classical information available to Eve are exactly the same for both protocols. Also, the correspondence between classical information (c i , k i ) and the quantum state in the actual protocol is identical to the one of the virtual protocol.
Proof of Proposition 1. First, we show that Eve's accessible quantum information is the same in both protocols. The case of the tagged signal (t i = t) or non-single-photon (n i = 1) emissions is clear, as the quantum states sent by Alice in both schemes coincide. Hence, the quantum information that is available to Eve is obviously the same in this case. As for the untagged single-photon emissions, we have that in the virtual protocol Alice sends Bob the virtual states [see Eq. (E9)], while in the actual protocol, she does not. Still, we have that also in this case Eve's accessible quantum information of the system B i is the same between the two protocols because the following relation
holds. To conclude, we show that Eve's accessible classical information is also equal in both protocols. For the case of the tagged signal (t i = t) or non-single-photon (n i = 1) emission event, since the quantum states are the same in both the actual and virtual protocols, the classical information declared by Alice and Bob in both schemes coincide. Hence, we only need to consider the equivalence between both protocols for the case of n i = 1 and t i = u. For this, we suppose that after finishing each of their joint measurements, Alice and Bob announce the classical information as follows. Whenever their measurement outcome on the system A i is α i ∈ {0, 1}, Alice and Bob declare over an authenticated public channel the Z basis. Also, Alice (Bob) announces the Z basis (X basis and its measurement outcome) when α i ∈ {2, 3}. Finally, if α i = 4 and Bob's basis choice is Z (X), Alice announces the X basis and Bob announces the Z (X) basis and its measurement outcome. This way, it is easy to see that the classical information announced in the actual and virtual protocols coincide. Furthermore, due to Eq. (E2), we can confirm that the correspondence between the classical information (c i , k i ) and the quantum state in the actual protocol is equivalent to the one of the virtual protocol. This ends the proof of the Proposition.
Thanks to this Proposition, the security statements that we derive for the virtual protocol can be applied as well to the actual protocol.
Next, we describe the state of the i th systems 
and B i is of the formσ
whereσ ζ i−1 ,I i−1 is defined aŝ
Here, the set of Kraus operators {Â th event with i ∈ S det . In particular, we are interested in the probability of obtaining the measurement outcome n i = 1 on the system N i , the measurement outcome g i ∈ G
i unt (namely, t i = u) on the system G i , the measurement outcome α i = α ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} on the system A i , and the measurement outcome y i = y ∈ {0, 1} in the X basis measurement on the system B i given that Bob's filter operation F was successful. Such probability can be expressed as
Here, we define
, q α := 1 for α ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} and
In Eq. (E15), for convenience of notation, we have defined A :
If we define N 1,u,α,y,X as the number of events where Alice obtains the measurement outcome n i = 1 on the system
, 1} on her system A i and Bob obtains the outcome y i = y ∈ {0, 1} in the X basis measurement on the system B i , the phase error rate is defined as the rate at which Bob obtains the outcome y i = α ⊕ 1 on the system B i among α=0,1,y=0,1 N 1,u,α,y,X . The phase error rate for the untagged single-photon emissions can be expressed as 
In the third equality, we use the assumption (B-1) in Sec. II B which states that the efficiency of Bob's measurement is the same for the bases Z and X. In Eq. (E17), the denominator can be estimated directly with the decoy-state method. Next, we calculate an upper bound for the quantity N ph,Z,Z,1,u,det . For this, we first relate N ph,Z,Z,1,u,det with the sum of the probabilities
can be done by using Azuma's inequality [42] ; we obtain 
In the first inequality, the parameter p (E22) The next step is to relate the sum of the probabilities i∈S det p(n i = 1, t i = u, α i = β, b i = X, y i = α⊕1|ζ i−1 , y i = ∅) with β ∈ {2, 3, 4} that appear in Eq. (E21) to the actual number of such events, which we denote by S c,1,u,det,α⊕1,X with c ∈ C 12 . For this, we again use Azuma's inequality [42] , and we obtain 
Now, if we combine Eqs. (E19), (E21), (E24) and (E25), we obtain the upper bound on N ph,Z,Z,1,u,det in Eq. (E17) as 
Recall that S c,1,u,det,α⊕1,X in Eq. (E26) is the number of instances where Alice emits an untagged single-photon using the setting {c ∈ C, b = X} and Bob obtains a detection event with the measurement outcome α ⊕ 1 ∈ {0, 1}. These quantities are not directly observed in the experiments, and hence we need to estimate them with the decoy-state method, as we have explained in Appendix D. Importantly, this has to be done in such a way that one obtains an upper-bound on N ph,Z,Z,1,u,det . In the case of S c,1,u,det,α⊕1,X , we take the following upper or lower bounds, depending on the sign of Γ Finally, we calculate the failure probability associated to the estimation of the upper bound on N ph,Z,Z,1,u,det conditioned on n tag ≤ N tag and S det = N det , which we denote by PH . It is given by the sum of 1 PH in Eq. (E27) and 2 PH that is the sum of the failure probabilities associated to the estimation of {S c,1,u,det,α,X } α=0,1,c∈C :
The parameter In this subsection, we describe the expression of the upper bound on the number of phase errors N ph,Z,Z,1,u,det with the general phase intervals that are shown in Eq. (10):
where − 
